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Gender Effects in Hedge Funds Performance 
 
 
GAN YOKE WAH, KAREN 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper shows that after controlling for total risks (as funds do not typically 
hold a completely large diversified portfolio) across different funds, female-
managed funds appear to perform better in certain circumstances. For example, 
female-managed hedge funds perform better during post-crisis times, for 
investments using the Relative Value Style and also when investments are in the 
Asia excluding Japan region. However, there are still many conditions in which 
male-managed funds seem to perform better. Namely, male-managed funds 
performed significantly positive in the Relative Value, Security Selection, and 
Multiprocess Styles, notably during the pre-crisis period and also when 
investments are in the “America” and “Others” regions. The study also shows that 
females definitely do not like to take risks and female-managed funds have lesser 
inflows relative to male-managed funds, especially when the funds' returns are 
small. Moreover, fund flows into and out of female-managed funds are more 
sensitive to the return outcomes.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In today’s world, top positions in politics, business and finance are occupied by 
women. Famous names such as Angela Merkel: Germany’s Chancellor, Janet 
Yellen: Federal Reserve’s Chairman and former US Secretary of State, Hillary 
Clinton, occupy top positions on Forbes’ list of most powerful women year after 
year. Despite these apparent gains, inequality between men and women still exists 
today. Based on the World Economic Forum’s 2015 Global Gender Gap Report, 
not a single country in the world has managed a perfect score of one which 
indicates perfect gender equality in terms of education and economic 
opportunities.  
 
This disparity in opportunities is well-known in the financial world. This is an 
industry where men still occupy the majority of the most senior and powerful 
positions today. The Morningstar Report on Fund Managers by Gender in June 
2015 showed that the incidence of female fund managers is rare. Women are so 
under-represented, that they constitute only 9.4% of all US mutual fund managers. 
As I show in this study, the scarcity of female managers can also be seen in the 
hedge fund industry, as participation is approximately 1%. So, where are the 
female fund managers? This question makes gender an interesting area of 
investigation for both practitioners and researchers.  
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This study investigates the effects of gender in the hedge fund industry and seeks 
to provide a better understanding and potential reasons for justifying the current 
shortage of female hedge fund managers. The hedge fund industry is an 
interesting arena to study gender effects, since it is similar to the mutual fund 
industry. There are several mutual funds studies on gender (eg. Bliss & Potter, 
2002; Niessen-Ruenzi & Ruenzi, 2015). 
 
Niessen-Ruenzi & Ruenzi (2015) report that investor bias towards the female 
gender is the reason for the lack of females. The study advances that the absence 
of female fund managers is due to their inability to attract inflows into the fund. 
Due to this inability to attract resources, females tend not to be as preferred by 
hiring companies as do their male counterparts.  
 
Money flows into a fund are famously linked to its performance. This 
performance-flow relationship is well-known to be positive (eg. Sirri & Tufano, 
1998; Chevalier & Ellison (1997). However, Niessen-Ruenzi & Ruenzi (2015) did 
not show that there is a difference in performance when female fund managers are 
compared to the males and continued to explain that the lower inflows into 
female-managed funds are simply due to gender biases. 
  
Following from the above studies on mutual funds, I examined the gender-
performance relationship as a starting point for hedge funds. Theoretically, 
performance has always been the main cause for why managers are chosen or not. 
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I tested the relationship between the presence of female managers in a fund and 
the fund performance. If good performance usually attracts money flows into a 
fund (eg. Sirri & Tufano, 1998), one reason for the dearth of female hedge fund 
managers may be due to their dull performance.  
 
In line with the above, this study also looks at whether flows into a hedge fund are 
lower whenever it is managed by a woman. My results show that female-managed 
funds have lesser inflows relative to male-managed funds, especially when the 
funds' returns are small. Succinctly stated, fund flows into and out of female-
managed funds are more sensitive to the return outcomes.  
 
At the same time, I found that female-managed funds do not appear to 
underperform, after controlling for total risks of the funds, using both the Fama-
MacBeth (1973) and time-series Portfolio Approaches. Total risk across funds is 
controlled because I recognise that funds do not typically hold a completely large 
diversified portfolio.  
 
The recent 2008 global financial crisis sent financial markets into mayhem. In 
order to examine whether female managers’ performance varies before and after 
this financial crisis, I tested the performance relationship for both periods. The 
results are fascinating, indicating that female-managed funds actually perform 
better on a risk-adjusted basis during the post-crisis times, suggestive of female 
hedge fund managers being more conservative and cautious after the global 
financial crisis. 
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I also introduced interaction variables into the performance relationship, exploring 
whether female-managed hedge funds perform differently for certain geographical 
mandates and investment styles. I found that there are some circumstances for 
which female-managed funds tend to perform well. Notwithstanding this, there 
are still a number of conditions whereby fund performance for male fund 
managers is better. 
 
To probe deeper into the performance of female hedge fund managers, I 
investigated their risk-taking behaviour relative to the male managers. I found that 
females take on lower risks, which is in accordance with previous studies (eg. 
Byrnes et al., 1999). Moreover, I explored whether female hedge fund managers 
are more or less distinct in their strategies when managing their funds and found 
that they are less distinctive than their male peers.  
 
To continue examining the performance of female-managed hedge funds, I found 
assorted results when fund characteristics are varied. This means that when we 
control for the level of certain fund characteristics, female-managed funds 
perform differently. I looked at three hedge fund characteristics to segment all of 
the funds into several classifications and performed a simple test of the difference 
in means for both before and post peak of the 2008 financial crisis to gauge 
female-managed hedge fund performance relative to male-managed funds. The 
results are notable. Female-managed hedge funds tended to perform better on a 
risk-adjusted basis during the post crisis time period. These results are consistent 
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with the earlier basic performance results. Again, I also recognise that male-
managed hedge funds still perform better in many circumstances. 
 
This study makes striking contributions to the literature on hedge funds as well as 
gender research in psychology. The existing hedge funds literature explored many 
fund characteristics and their effects on performance but there is a limited focus 
on gender. Hence, this study adds to the list of variables to better understand the 
determinants of hedge fund performance.  
 
Moreover, this study contributes to the psychology literature on how the presence 
of different traits determines the way female fund managers and male fund 
managers behave, applied to a hedge fund setting.  One such trait is explained by 
risk-taking papers such as Byrnes et al. (1999), which found females to be more 
risk-averse. In this study, I found evidence that female-managed hedge funds 
perform better than male-managed funds during times of uncertainty most notably 
during the post-global financial crisis. This may be because female fund managers 
are likely to be more cautious and conservative in their investment behaviour 
during these volatile times. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as such: Section 2 reviews the current 
literature and structures the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, the variables 
used in this study and the methodology. Section 4 presents the results and finally 
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the results.  
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
2.1 Determinants of Hedge Fund Performance 
 
Hedge fund performance has been well studied. Studies have investigated various 
issues that may determine how a hedge fund performs. Some investigated biases 
and how they should be recognised while examining hedge fund performance 
(Fung & Hsieh, 2000). Several studies investigated performance benchmarks to 
better understand hedge fund returns (Fung & Hsieh, 2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2004). 
Agarwal et al (2009) analysed how the incentives provided to managers and other 
characteristics involving redemption terms affect hedge fund performance.  
 
This study aims to contribute to this line of research on hedge fund performance 
by also looking at the gender of managers and their performance across a number 
of performance variables. 
 
2.2 Gender 
 
There are limited studies on the relationship between gender and hedge fund 
performance. A recent paper (Aggarwal & Boyson, 2015) studied this relationship 
and found that there is no difference in performance between females and males. 
The current study differs from the work of Aggarwal & Boyson, as different 
variables were used to investigate the gender effects on hedge fund performance. 
Firstly, my performance measure as the dependent variable is different as I apply 
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the Fung & Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model when estimating my Alpha measure. 
This method of estimating Alpha is used by many hedge fund studies (eg. Teo, 
2011). I also control for riskiness of the funds when using the Alpha measure, so 
that the performance measure becomes risk-adjusted. Moreover, I segregated the 
total evaluation period into two subsamples: pre and post 2008 financial crisis 
periods. All of these measures and controls will be explained in greater details in 
the methodology section. 
 
Another measure of performance also employed in this study is the Appraisal 
Ratio. This measure looks at the performance of the individual fund while taking 
into account the riskiness of all the funds in the portfolio. The Appraisal Ratio will 
be used for the Triple Sorts tests later in the paper. The Appraisal Ratio has 
previously been used in mutual fund studies (eg. Brown et al., 1992). 
 
Further, I used various other dependent variables, such as (1) strategy 
distinctiveness, (2) risks and (3) flow, to examine the performance of female 
hedge fund managers. The database employed in this study is also different from 
that of Aggarwal & Boyson (2015). Additionally, and most importantly, the way I 
measure the Gender variable is also different. The operationalization of these 
characteristics will be explained in detail during later sections of this study. 
 
In the Psychology literature, there is a stream of studies attempting to explain the 
difference in gender performance. For instance, it has been advanced that females 
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are brought up differently (eg. Hoffman, 1991) and assigned different roles as a 
child (Goodnow, 1988). These roots mould men and women differently 
influencing how they behave. One study documents that women are inflicted by 
the “Stereotype Threat” (Spencer et al., 1999), such that they think they are 
scrutinised in tasks that they generally do not excel. In that study, women 
unperformed in math tests when told they usually underperform. This study 
suggests that the possibility of being likened to the stereotype of losing builds an 
added pressure on women, such that their actual performance is affected. In lay 
terms, it is advanced that females choke under pressure when the stakes are 
higher. 
 
Gneezy et al. (2003) further investigated this in competitive environments and 
found that women tend to underperform more than men when there is 
competition. Fryer et al. (2008) also added to the Stereotype Threat literature by 
looking at how the presence of financial rewards tend to further increase the stress 
levels of women during performance.     
 
There are several studies on gender differences in the finance literature. Besides 
the recent work of Aggarwal & Boyson (2015) mentioned above, other studies 
include Atkinson et al. (2003), who found that investors put less money with 
mutual funds managed by females. Niessen-Ruenzi & Ruenzi (2015) explained 
that the lower inflows into female-managed funds is because investors may be 
subject to biases towards females. The finding of a bias is further supported when 
matched with the work of Kumar (2010) who found that female equity analysts 
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provided more accurate forecasts than their male counterparts. Additionally, 
Wolfers (2006) analysed performance of stocks of firms headed by females and 
males and found no significant differences.  
 
2.3 Risks  
 
It is well-documented in the literature, both finance and psychology, that women 
do not like risks. Barsky et al. (1997) examined risk preferences of their 
respondents with different habits and from different demographic groups. They 
found that males tolerate risks more than females.  Byrnes et al. (1999) performed 
a meta-analysis of 150 similar studies and concluded that females are more risk-
averse. Wilson & Daly (1985) explained that men tend to compete more and 
hence will take more risks while doing so.  
 
Powell & Ansic (1997) found that females tend to take lower risks in making 
financial decisions, even in tasks they are familiar with. Linking to financial 
markets, Barber & Odean (2001) found that males trade more than females 
because males are overconfident, and not simply because they take more risks. 
Huang & Kisgen (2013) found the same story on overconfidence in the corporate 
finance world, showing that females actually make lesser acquisitions than men 
and also issue lesser debt.  
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The current literature supports the claim that females generally are less of a risk 
taker. Accordingly, Hypothesis 1 is as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Female hedge fund managers take lesser risks. 
 
In this study, I control for risks and then test the performance of female-managed 
hedge funds. Hence, my Hypothesis 2 will be as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Female-managed hedge funds underperform on a risk-adjusted 
basis. 
 
2.4 Strategy Distinctiveness 
 
According to current social research, women tend to favour communal behaviour, 
whereas men are more individualistic and independent (eg. Josephs et al., 1992; 
Cross & Madson, 1997). Many studies summarise how women care more about 
the group relationships while men are tougher due in part to their family 
upbringing and environment (eg. Hoffman, 1991). 
 
It follows that if women are less independent, they are more likely to adopt 
common strategies used by all their counterparts. On the other hand, since men are 
more independent in their thinking and at the same time, overconfident (Barber & 
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Odean, 2001), such that they believe in the accuracy of their undertakings, they 
are more likely to adopt more distinctive strategies when managing hedge funds. 
  
Sun et al. (2012) explained in their study on hedge funds that when unique 
strategies that are distinct from others are adopted, the fund will enjoy greater 
performance. I propose that fund managers who are female tend to be less 
independent, more risk-averse and therefore are more likely to assume less 
distinct strategies. My Hypothesis 3 is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Female hedge fund managers engage in less distinctive strategies.  
 
2.5 Performance-Flow  
 
Many studies examined money flows into a fund. Goetzmann et al. (2003) found 
that investors take money out of large hedge funds. Kumar et al. (2015) found that 
mutual funds with managers that have less familiar-sounding names attract lower 
money flows. Lan et al. (2013) looked at performance-induced flows as part of 
their model on hedge fund dynamics. Niessen-Ruenzi & Ruenzi (2015) found that 
investors put less money with mutual funds managed by women.  
 
Following from these studies, I test whether the lesser flows apply to Female-
managed hedge funds too. Hence, Hypothesis 4 is as follows: 
 12 
 
Hypothesis 4: Female-managed hedge funds have lower money inflows. 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The data used to investigate these hypotheses comes from Eurekahedge database 
for the period January 1994 to October 2014. The data contains information on 
hedge fund characteristics, performance and assets under management for 16,606 
hedge funds. This dataset includes both live and dead funds and hence 
survivorship bias is allayed. The reason why this database is selected is because it 
contains the hedge fund managers’ biography which is important for my study. It 
is important to note, a recent paper, Aggarwal & Boyson (2015), which also 
focused on female hedge fund managers, used a different dataset from Thomson-
Reuters. 
 
There is a total of 16,606 funds in the database, however, only 13,909 funds has 
information on returns and assets under management. Out of this, 7,593 are live 
and 6,316 are dead. Other information used in my analysis include characteristics 
such as fees (both management and performance), size of the fund, notice period 
for redemption, style of investment, region where the fund invests, fund age since 
inception and minimum investment amount. For the minimum investment amount, 
in order to use US dollars as the base denomination, I use exchange rates as at end 
of October 2014 to convert those that are reported in the database as non-US 
dollars.  
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All funds in my dataset are classified into a total of five investment styles. The 
first four investment styles are consistent with those documented by Agarwal et 
al., (2009), namely Relative Value, Security Selection, Directional Traders and 
Multiprocess. I have also included an Others category to capture the funds that 
cannot easily be classified into the four Styles. The four styles are unique in their 
own ways. Those that adopt the Relative Value style, target lesser market 
exposure taking positions on relationships of the spread between financial assets’ 
prices. Security Selection takes positions in undervalued and overvalued assets. 
The Directional Traders strategy speculates on the price trend of various 
securities. And finally the Multiprocess style adopts numerous strategies investing 
in significant events, for example, mergers and acquisitions. I also classify all 
funds in my dataset into five geographical investment regions. They are namely, 
America, Europe, Asia including Japan, Asia excluding Japan, and Others.  
 
Further, to investigate whether there are differences in the performance of female-
managed hedge funds during the pre and post 2008 financial crisis time periods, I 
segment the total evaluation period into two subsamples: pre-crisis period 
(January 1997 to August 2008) and post-crisis period (September 2008 to October 
2014). The time surrounding September 2008 was recognised by many previous 
studies as the peak of the financial crisis (eg. Campello et al., 2010; Santos, 2011). 
In line with these previous studies, I use September 2008 to partition my total 
evaluation period, as there are heightened sensitivities to systemic risks after this 
date.  
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As shown by Figure 1 below, there is a significant fall in the S&P500 index and a 
spike in the VIX
1
 index surrounding the month of September 2008, presenting 
evidence that this is the height of the financial crisis. Also, as shown in Figure 2, 
the volatility of the funds in my analysis (as represented by the average of the 
standard deviation of all the funds’ excess returns for the past 12 months) 
escalated from September 2008. In combination these findings further justify the 
partitioning of the data. 
  
                                                          
1
 VIX represents the Chicago Board Options Exchange (“CBOE”) Volatility Index for S&P500 index 
options 
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Figure 1: VIX and S&P 500 indices  
Figure 1 shows the VIX Index and the S&P500 index, highlighting the peak of the 
financial crisis during September 2008. 
 
Source: Yahoo Finance 
 
Figure 2: Average Standard Deviation of all funds 
Figure 2 shows the average standard deviation of all the funds for my evaluation 
period.  
 
Source: Eurekahedge database (www.eurekahedge.com) 
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3.2 Key variables 
 
3.2.1 Gender Measure 
 
The gender variable is obtained from analysing the biography of the managers 
provided in the database. I use the words ‘he’ or ‘she’ and ‘his’ or ‘hers’ to 
identify the gender of the managers. Those managers without clear indication of 
being a female are classified as males. Only the female managers who are either 
“Portfolio Managers” or “Chief Investment Officers” are included in my analysis. 
Other roles such as administration or marketing are dropped from the female 
variable. That is, they are not considered to be funds managed by a female. Such 
information is identified from a thorough analysis of the biography of the 
managers, either obtained from the database or from the web. Although another 
study on female managers uses the prefixes as gender identifiers (Aggarwal & 
Boyson, 2015), such a field is often not available in my database. Therefore, I use 
the above method instead.  
 
In summary, I identified on average, across funds and over time, 129 female 
managers (see Table 1). However, it is worthwhile to note that at the beginning of 
our sample period, there were a small number of females. This number started to 
grow since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (see Figure 3). Hence, I also report 
the maximum number of females and males otherwise the number of females will 
seem underestimated. The largest number of females was 146 recorded for May 
2011.  
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In addition, as the female managers may not be managing the fund from the 
beginning of the fund’s inception, I search the web for information as to whether 
the female managers started the fund or actually took over the fund. So, the 
Female dummy variable which spans both cross-sectional and over time, will only 
show a ‘1’ for that month when the fund is actually managed by a female and ‘0’ 
otherwise. 
 
Table 1: Gender Statistics 
Table 1 shows the statistics of the Gender in our sample. In each of the style 
categories, I report the average number of Females and Males across funds and 
over time. I also report the maximum number of Females and Males. 
 
Investment 
Strategy 
 
Total 
Funds 
Live 
Funds 
Dead 
Funds 
No. of 
Females 
(Ave/ 
month) 
Max 
Females 
(per 
month) 
No. of 
Males 
(Ave/ 
month) 
Max 
Males 
(per 
month) 
Relative 
Value 
2,353 1,446 907 20 53 2,333 2,351 
Security 
Selection 
6,161 3,256 2,905 72 146 6,089 6,159 
Directional 
Traders 
3,030 1,594 1,436 14 30 3,016 3,028 
Multi-
process 
1,964 1,101 863 20 35 1,944 1,963 
Others 401 196 205 3 10 398 401 
Total 13,909 7,593 6,316 129 - 13,780 - 
Source: Eurekahedge database (www.eurekahedge.com) 
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Figure 3: Gender Statistics 
Figure 3 shows the number of Females over time for each of the style categories 
in our sample. The style categories are Relative Value (“RV”), Security Selection 
(“SS”), Directional Traders (“DT”), Multiprocess (“MP”) and Others (“OT”). 
 
 
Source: Eurekahedge database (www.eurekahedge.com) 
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1997 to October 2014) available for my analysis. Then, Alpha is calculated after 
subtracting the above factor times loadings from excess returns for each fund (as 
shown in the below equation). The Alpha measure is used as the dependent 
variable in the cross-sectional regressions for every month for the various 
multivariate analyses in this study. 
 
𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑚 =  𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑚 − (𝛽1𝑖,𝑚𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑖,𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚
+  𝛽3𝑖,𝑚𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑚  +  𝛽4𝑖,𝑚𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑚 + 𝛽5𝑖,𝑚𝑇𝐹𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑚
+  𝛽6𝑖,𝑚𝑇𝐹𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑚 +  𝛽7𝑖,𝑚𝑇𝐹𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚) 
 
where Equity is the excess of Standard and Poor’s 500 returns over the risk-free 
return, Size is the Russell 2000 index monthly total return minus Standard & 
Poor’s 500 monthly total return, BondMkt is the change per month in the 10-yr 
treasury constant maturity yield, CreditSprd is the change per month in Moody's 
Baa yield minus 10-yr treasury constant maturity yield, and the three Trend-
following risk factors: TFBond, TFCurr and TFComm, representing Bond, 
Currency and Commodity respectively
2
, i = fund i, m = month m,  = factor 
coefficient. These are consistent with the analysis of Fung & Hsieh (2004). 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The method for estimating each of the seven factors from Fung & Hsieh (2004) and data for the trend-
following factors are obtained from David A. Hsieh’s data library. 
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B. Appraisal Ratio 
 
This study also employs another measure of performance - Appraisal Ratio. 
Appraisal Ratio is obtained from dividing Alpha for each fund with the total risks 
(as measured by Standard Deviation) of the excess returns of all the funds in the 
same portfolio. Standard Deviation in the equation below measures the deviation 
of the excess returns of all the funds in that particular portfolio ‘j’ that fund ‘i’ is 
in.  
 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑚 =  
𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑚
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑚
 
where i = fund i, j = portfolio j, m = month m 
 
This performance measure looks at performance of the individual fund while 
taking into account the riskiness of all the funds in the portfolio. The Appraisal 
Ratio will be used for the Triple Sorts tests later in the paper. The Appraisal Ratio 
is used in the mutual fund studies (eg. Brown et al., 1992).  
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3.2.3 Key Fund Characteristics 
 
To control for the effects on performance from various characteristics that are 
common to a hedge fund, I include them in my multivariate analyses. First, the 
common type of hedge fund fees are included, both Management Fees and 
Performance Fees. Next, I control for the age of the fund since inception. Then, 
the size of the fund in terms of assets under management is controlled too. Both 
the fund age and size are lagged by 1 month. Moreover, since hedge funds have 
many restrictions on money withdrawals, I also control for the period of notice 
required to be provided before investors can take out money from the fund. 
Besides that, the minimum amount of investments in the fund is added as a control 
variable too. These are all shown in Table 2. In some of the multivariate tests 
later, I include Style and Region dummies too.  
 
In Table 2 below, I also show the results from a test of difference in means 
between female-managed funds and male-managed funds for each of the fund 
characteristics, additionally, the t-statistics are also reported.  
 
From this basic test of differences, it is worthwhile to note several interesting 
points. Firstly, female-managed funds charge higher fees, both management and 
performance. For management fees, female-managed funds charge 0.03% higher 
per month than males (t-statistic = 12.9) and for performance fees, female-
managed funds charge 1.54% higher per month (t-statistic = 17.89). 
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Also, the funds that are managed by females are younger and smaller as shown by 
the results in fund age and size. For fund age, female-managed funds are about 8 
months younger (t-statistic = -15.70). And for size, females manage funds that are 
smaller than males by about US$55 million (t-statistic = -23.41). Also, investors 
need to give longer notice for redemption of money for female-managed funds by 
about 5 days (t-statistic = 23.6). 
 
Looking at Table 2, there is no evidence that female-managed funds underperform 
those managed by males across all funds in general. This assertion is supported by 
the findings that the coefficients for the performance measures, Excess Returns 
and Alpha, for “F-M” are both negative, but, not significant.  
 
Also, as we delve into the individual styles, it indicates that only the Relative 
Value and Security Selection styles have significantly negative differences in 
mean excess returns between the female-managed funds and the male-managed 
funds. Although Directional Traders shows a negative difference, it is not 
significant. Multiprocess and Others both show positive signs. This seems to 
suggest that there is no clear evidence about the underperformance of female-
managed funds.  
 
Therefore, these initial analyses on the fund characteristics provide some evidence 
in contrast to our Hypothesis 2 that female-managed funds underperform male-
managed funds. 
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The recent similar study by Aggarwal & Boyson (2015) focused on the Funds of 
Funds style in their study and found no significant performance differences 
between female-managed funds and male-managed funds in that style.  
 
An interesting finding to note is, that the mean excess returns from the Security 
Selection style is not lower than the other styles even though there are more 
female managers in this style as shown by the gender statistics in Table 1.     
 
 
Table 2: Key Fund Characteristics 
This table reflects the fund characteristics, showing first the total mean for all the 
funds and then categorising into Females and Males. Excess Returns are the 
Returns of the fund in excess of the risk-free rate. Alpha is obtained from using 
time-series regressions of returns against the seven factors from Fung & Hsieh 
(2004) over a period of 36 months. Management Fee and Performance Fee are 
fees common to a hedge fund. Age is the fund’s age from inception. AUM is assets 
under management. Redemption Notice is the period of notice required for 
redemption of money from the fund. Min Inv Amt is the minimum amount of 
investments in the fund. Standard deviation is the deviation of the fund’s excess 
returns for the past 12 months. Also, the t-statistic is computed for the difference 
in means to show how the Females and Males compare in the various fund 
characteristics. (T-statistics are shown in the parentheses). The significance levels 
are denoted as ** and * for 1% and 5% respectively. 
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Fund 
Characteristics 
 
 
Mean  
 
SD (monthly) 
 All Female Male F-M All Female Male 
Excess Returns  
(% annualised) 
8.19 6.93 8.23 -1.30 
(-1.82) 
0.05 0.05 0.05 
Alpha 
(% annualised) 
7.95 7.35 7.97 -0.62 
(-0.84) 
0.05 0.05 0.05 
Management Fee 
(% monthly) 
1.52 1.55 1.52 0.03** 
(12.90) 
0.01 0.004 0.01 
Performance Fee 
(% monthly) 
17.33 18.87 17.32 1.54** 
(17.89) 
0.07 0.05 0.07 
Age  
(in months) 
57 49 57 -8.18** 
(-15.70) 
62 57 62 
AUM (US$mil, 
monthly) 
164.81 111.37 166.44 -55.07** 
(-23.41) 
732.70 618.96 735.98 
Redemption 
Notice (days) 
30 35 30 5.56** 
(23.60) 
33 31 33 
Min Inv Amt 
(US$mil, 
monthly) 
149.44 245.36 147.76 97.60 
(1.67) 
5,197.91 11,865.84 5,096.61 
Risk measure        
Standard 
deviation 
(annualised) 
0.44 0.42 0.44 -0.02** 
(-4.62) 
0.04 0.03 0.04 
Styles Performance 
(Mean Excess Returns,  
% annual) 
All Female Male F-M All Female Male 
Relative Value 6.02 4.47 6.07 -1.59* 
(-1.99) 
0.04 0.02 0.04 
Security Selection 8.91 6.55 8.97 -2.42* 
(-2.53) 
0.05 0.04 0.05 
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Directional Traders 8.03 5.16 8.07 -2.9 
(-1.42) 
0.06 0.05 0.05 
Multiprocess 8.65 11.21 8.56 2.64 
(1.35) 
0.04 0.05 0.05 
Others 10.84 10.53 10.8 2.39 
(0.72) 
0.06 0.05 0.05 
 
 
3.2.4 Risk Measures 
 
In order to test whether females actually take lower risks when managing hedge 
funds, I used the Standard Deviation as a measure of risks. The total risk is 
measured from calculating the standard deviation of the past 12 months’ excess 
returns for each fund. The Standard Deviation measure used for risks is used in 
many finance papers (eg. Sharpe, 1964).  
 
I removed data that are reflective of illiquid trading where the Standard Deviation 
of excess returns is less than 0.00001. There are only 31 such data points.  
 
3.2.5 Strategy Distinctiveness  
 
One of the many ways to determine the performance of hedge funds is whether 
the managers are skilled or not. If they are, they will tend to adopt unique 
strategies that differ from the rest of their peers (Sun et al., 2012). I test for this in 
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my study to explore the strategy distinctiveness of the female managers when 
compared to their male counterparts. 
 
Following the definition of distinctiveness used in Sun et al. (2012), I calculate the 
“Strategy Distinctiveness Index” (SDI) by subtracting the correlation of the 
individual fund with all funds in the same style category for the past 24 months 
from 1 (see below equation). Therefore, if the SDI is higher, it would mean that 
the fund has adopted a strategy that is less similar with the other funds in the same 
style category.  
 
𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑚 = 1 − 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑚,  𝜇𝑎,𝑚)  
 
where SDIi,m is the Strategy Distinctiveness Index for fund i in month m, Reti,m is 
the returns for fund i in month m and a,m is the mean returns for all the funds in 
Style a that are in month m. 
 
3.2.6 Flow 
 
The Flow variable is calculated using the fund’s assets under management and 
returns in the following equation: 
𝑭𝑳𝑶𝑾𝒊,𝒎 =  
𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑚 − 𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑚−1 ∗  (1 +  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑚)
𝐴𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑚−1
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where Flowi,m is the flow of the fund i for month m, AUMi,m is fund i's total assets 
under management at time m, and Reti,m is fund i's return over the previous month. 
I measure Flow at the end of the period. Similar to many existing studies (eg. Sirri 
& Tufano, 1998), Flow shows how much a fund grows on top of the growth that is 
derived from performance if there were no new inflows into the fund. 
 
3.3  Methodology 
 
The performance of female-managed hedge funds suggested by the summary 
statistics should be investigated further using several other approaches as 
explained in this section. 
 
3.3.1 Fama-MacBeth (1973) Cross-sectional regressions 
 
I analyse the performance of female-managed hedge funds using the multivariate 
analysis. The performance measure as described in the earlier section (Alpha) is 
used as the dependent variables for my analyses. To start, Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
cross-sectional regressions are run for every month of the sample period from 
January 1997 to October 2014, giving a total of 214 regressions. Thereafter I test 
whether the time-series average coefficient estimates are significantly different 
from zero by evaluating the t-statistics. 
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In the multivariate analyses, all of the fund characteristics described earlier are 
used as independent variables, including the Female dummy. Various dependent 
variables are used to test numerous hypotheses.  
 
First, I test the performance relationship without including the region and style 
dummies (Equation 1). In this equation, I adjust for total risks of the funds using 
the variable Standard Deviation, which is the deviation of the fund’s excess 
returns for the past 12 months. I control for total risks across different funds as 
funds do not typically hold a completely large diversified portfolio. 
 
Equation 1 : Basic Alpha Regression 
𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑚 =  𝛼 + 1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 + 2𝑀𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖 + 3𝑃𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖 + 4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑚−1  +

5
 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑚−1 + 6𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖 + 7𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 +  8𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑚  +   𝜖𝑖,𝑚 
 
Next, I test for the interaction of the Female variable with the Region dummies 
and then the Style dummies in 2 separate tests (Equations 2 and 3 respectively). In 
the two equations, both Female and Male dummies are used. Also, similar to 
Equation 1, I adjust for risks of the funds using the variable Standard Deviation, 
which is the deviation of the fund’s excess returns for the past 12 months. 
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Equation 2 : Region Interaction 
𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑚 
=  
1
𝑀𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖 +  2𝑃𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖 +  3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑚−1  + 4 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑚−1 + 5𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖
+  
6
𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 +  7𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑚  
+
8
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝐺1𝑖  + 9𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝐺2𝑖  + 10𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝐺3𝑖  +
 
11
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝐺4𝑖  +  12𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝐺5𝑖  +  13𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝐺1𝑖  +
 
14
𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝐺2𝑖  +  15𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝐺3𝑖  +  16𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝐺4𝑖  + 17𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝐺5𝑖  +  
𝜖𝑖,𝑚 
 
Equation 3 : Style Interaction 
𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑚 
=  
1
𝑀𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖 +  2𝑃𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖 +  3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑚−1  + 4 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑚−1 + 5𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖
+  
6
𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 +  7𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑚  
+
8
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝑆1𝑖  + 9𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝑆2𝑖  +  10𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝑆3𝑖  +
 
11
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝑆4𝑖  + 12𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝑆5𝑖  +  13𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝑆1𝑖  +
 
14
𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝑆2𝑖  +  15𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝑆3𝑖  +  16𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝑆4𝑖  + 17𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 𝑆5𝑖  +  
𝜖𝑖,𝑚 
 
After using Alpha as the dependent variable for the above Equations, I used other 
dependent variables (such as SDI, SD and Flow) to test for further relationships 
with the Female variable. These tests will be performed using Equation 4 below. 
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Equation 4 : All other dependent variables 
𝐷𝑉𝑖,𝑚  =  𝛼 + 1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑚 +  2𝑀𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖 +  3𝑃𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖 +  4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑚−1  +

5
 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑚−1 + 6𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖 + 7𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛽8
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑖
𝑆𝑆−1
𝑆=1 +
 ∑ 𝛽9
𝐺𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
𝐺𝐺−1
𝐺=1  +  𝜖𝑖,𝑚 
 
The above abbreviations represent the following: Female is the Dummy with ‘1’ 
representing Female and ‘0’ otherwise as Male. The symbol ‘m’ is month m. 
MFeei is the management fees for fund i. PFeei is the performance fees for fund i. 
LogAUMi,m-1 is taking the logarithm of the assets under management for month m-
1 for size of the fund i. FundAgei,m-1 is the age of the fund i in  previous month, 
MinInvi is the minimum amount of funds invested for fund i, RedempNoticei  is the 
notice period given for redemption of money from the fund i, Style is the style 
dummy and Region is the dummy for the region of investment. SDi,m is the 
Standard Deviation of fund i, representing the deviation of the fund’s excess 
returns for the past 12 months, to control for the total risks of funds. S represents 
the Styles and G represents the Regions. All  are the coefficient estimates.  
represents the constant estimated from the regressions. 
 
For the interaction terms in Equations 2 and 3, there are a total of 10 interaction 
variables in each of the two equations, 5 for Female and 5 for Male. For example, 
“Female G1” is the Dummy with ‘1’ representing females managing the fund for 
Geographical Region 1 (“G1”) and ‘0’ otherwise. Similarly, “Male G1” is the 
Dummy with ‘1’ representing males managing the fund for Geographical Region 
 31 
 
1 (“G1”) and ‘0’ otherwise. The five regions, as explained earlier are namely, 
America (“G1”), Europe (“G2”), Asia including Japan (“G3”), Asia excluding 
Japan (“G4”) and Others (“G5”). The same applies for the five Styles, namely 
Relative Value (“S1”), Security Selection (“S2”), Directional Traders (“S3”), 
Multiprocess (“S4”) and Others (“S5”). 
 
3.3.2 Triple Sorts Approach 
 
To further investigate the performance of female-managed funds, I segregated all 
the hedge funds according to three important hedge fund characteristics. They are 
namely the size of the fund, performance fees and the redemption notice period. 
Existing researchers have discussed these fund characteristics in their relationship 
to performance (eg. Agarwal et al, 2009). 
 
My first step was to divide all funds into two according to the size of their assets 
under management, categorising them into either “Small” or “Large” funds. Next, 
for each of the two size classes, I ranked them into three categories using the 
performance fees they charge - “Low” or “Medium” or “High” performance fees. 
This resulted in six buckets of classifications. Finally, in each of these six 
categories, I further sifted them into three categories each according to the length 
of the redemption notice period - “Short” or “Medium” or “Long”. Redemption 
notice period, as explained earlier in the report is the length of notice required for 
taking money out of the fund. In sum, there were eighteen classifications into 
which all funds were categorized (see Figure 4). 
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For assets under management, “S” and “L” denote Small and Large respectively. 
For performance fees, “L”, “M” and “H” represents Low, Medium and High 
respectively. For redemption notice period, “S”, “M” and “L” represents Short, 
Medium and Long respectively. 
 
After classifying the funds into the eighteen buckets or segments, I identified the 
Appraisal Ratio for every female and male-managed fund. Appraisal Ratio, as 
explained earlier, is obtained from dividing Alpha with the total risks (measured 
by Standard Deviation) of the excess returns in each of the 18 segments, 
segregating into female and male-managed funds. Next, the spread of the mean 
Appraisal Ratio between the females and males (“F-M”) was computed to see 
whether female-managed funds perform significantly better or worse than male-
managed funds on a risk-adjusted basis using the t-test.  
 
To test for whether there is a performance difference between pre and post 2008 
financial crisis periods, I performed the Triple Sorts tests three times: firstly for all 
periods (January 1997 to October 2014), secondly for the pre-crisis period 
(January 1997 to August 2008) and finally for the post-crisis period (September 
2008 to October 2014).  
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Figure 4: Triple Sorts 
Figure 4 shows how all funds are categorised according to 3 categories: 1. Assets 
under Management (“AUM”), 2. Performance fees (“PFee”) and 3. Redemption 
Notice period (“Redp Notice”).  
 
 
3.3.3  Portfolio Approach – Garch in mean 
 
To analyse whether Females perform better than Males, I used the portfolio-based 
approach similarly employed by other researchers (eg. Teo, 2011). Firstly, I sort 
all the funds using Excess Returns by whether the fund is managed by a female or 
male in every month (that is, using the Female dummy variable) and then take the 
value-weighted average across all funds. This resulted in two time-series of 
average returns, one for females and one for males.  
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Next, I regressed each of these time-series against the seven factors from Fung & 
Hsieh (2004). The seven factors take care of the risks related to the nature of 
hedge funds. Namely they are the Equity factor which is the excess of Standard 
and Poor’s 500 returns over the risk-free return; Size factor is the Russell 2000 
index monthly total return minus Standard & Poor’s 500 monthly total return; 
Bond market factor which is the change per month in the 10-year treasury 
constant maturity yield; Credit Spread factor which is the change per month in the 
Moody's Baa yield minus 10-year treasury constant maturity yield and three trend-
following risk factors: Bond, Currency and Commodity
3
.  
 
There were two separate tests, one for Female and one for Male. The Garch-in-
mean approach is used because it introduces another explanatory variable: 
contemporaneous return variance. This was estimated using the GARCH (1,1) 
model. This helps to avoid adhoc measures of historical variances that may 
correlate with the error in regression. The model contains variance as endogenous 
in the mean equation instead of standard deviation (Equation 5). This is because 
the use of standard deviation produces non-convergence due to a very flat 
maximum likelihood function. 
 
I then report the constant from each of these regressions, which indicates the risk-
adjusted excess returns. 
 
                                                          
3 The method for estimating each of the seven factors from Fung & Hsieh (2004) and data for the trend-
following factors are obtained from David A. Hsieh’s data library. 
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Equation 5 : Garch-in-mean - Portfolio based approach 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑚 =  𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑚 +  𝑐2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚 +  𝑐3𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑚  
+  𝑐4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑚 + 𝑐5𝑇𝐹𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑚 +  𝑐6𝑇𝐹𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑚
+  𝑐7𝑇𝐹𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝑏𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑚)   +   𝜖𝑚   
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑚) =  𝑑0 + 𝑑1𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑚−1)  + 𝑑2𝜖𝑚−1
2    
 
where Equity is the excess of Standard and Poor’s 500 returns over the risk-free 
return, Size is the Russell 2000 index monthly total return minus Standard & 
Poor’s 500 monthly total return, BondMkt is the change per month in the 10-yr 
treasury constant maturity yield, CreditSprd is the change per month in Moody's 
Baa yield minus 10-yr treasury constant maturity yield, and the three Trend-
following risk factors: TFBond, TFCurr and TFComm, representing Bond, 
Currency and Commodity respectively
4
, i = fund i, m = month m, c1 to c7 = factor 
coefficients, d = coefficients. c0 is the risk-adjusted return. The Excess Returns 
(“Excess Retm”) measure is the value-weighted average excess returns for all 
funds managed by either females or males in the two separate tests for month m. 
The Variance (“Var (Retm)”) is the variation of all funds’ value-weighted excess 
returns for month m, managed by either females or males in the two separate tests 
accordingly.  
 
  
                                                          
4 The method for estimating each of the seven factors from Fung & Hsieh (2004) and data for the trend-
following factors are obtained from David A. Hsieh’s data library. 
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4. Results 
 
4.1 Fama-MacBeth (1973) Cross-sectional regressions 
 
4.1.1  Performance 
 
The results reported in Table 3 are interesting. After controlling for the various 
fund characteristics, the coefficient estimate of the Female variable is negative but 
not significant. Therefore, this basic result using Fama-Macbeth (1973) regression 
with Alpha as the dependent variable indicate that there is no evidence that 
female-managed funds underperform male-managed funds on a risk-adjusted 
basis, providing no support for Hypothesis 2.  
 
In the meantime, looking at the other control variables in Table 3, the coefficients 
are in line with existing studies. When a fund gets older, the performance tends to 
decline (Aggarwal & Jorion, 2010), as shown by the negative coefficient for the 
fund age variable in Table 3. When a fund charges higher performance fees, its 
performance is better than otherwise (Agarwal et al, 2009), as evidenced by the 
positive coefficient of the performance fee variable of my results below. Also, the 
significantly positive coefficient of the Standard Deviation variable is consistent 
with Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) studies that higher risks taken 
produce higher returns.  
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Table 3: Fama-Macbeth (1973) results with Performance as the dependent 
variable 
Table 3 shows results from the Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions with the 
performance measure as the dependent variable. Alpha is obtained from using 
time-series regressions of returns against the seven factors from Fung & Hsieh 
(2004) over a period of 36 months. In the multivariate analysis, the independent 
variables are the management fees, performance fee, fund age, the log of assets 
under management, minimum investment amount and the notice period for 
redemption. I also included the Standard Deviation to control for the total risks of 
funds. Period is from January 1997 to October 2014. (T-statistics are shown in the 
parentheses). The significance levels are denoted as ** and * for 1% and 5% 
respectively. 
  Dependent variable 
  Alpha (percent/year) 
Independent 
variables   
Female -0.51 
  (-0.49) 
Management fee 23.41 
  (0.47) 
Performance fee 3.64 
  (0.68) 
Fund age in months -0.02 
  (-1.93) 
Log AUM (fund size) -0.26 
  (-1.09) 
MinInv -0.03 
  (-1.12) 
Redep Notice 0.02 
  (1.61) 
Stand Dev 126.97** 
  (3.02) 
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Next, I continued to investigate whether there is difference in the performance of 
female-managed funds during the pre and post 2008 financial crisis time periods. 
To do this, I subdivided the total evaluation period into 2 subsamples: pre-crisis 
period (January 1997 to August 2008) and post-crisis period (September 2008 to 
October 2014). As explained earlier, September 2008 was recognised by many 
studies as the peak of the financial crisis, as this is the time when the financial 
markets saw clear signs of the financial turmoil.  
 
Table 3.1: Fama-Macbeth (1973) results with Performance as the 
dependent variable (2 subsample periods - pre and post-crisis) 
Table 3.1 shows results from the Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions with the 
performance measure as the dependent variable. This is a continuation from Table 
3 and shows results for the Female variable for 2 subsample periods. The 2 
subsample periods are: (1) pre-crisis period: January 1997 to August 2008, (2) 
post-crisis period: September 2008 to October 2014. Alpha is obtained from using 
time-series regressions of returns against the seven factors from Fung & Hsieh 
(2004) over a period of 36 months. (T-statistics are shown in the parentheses). The 
significance levels are denoted as ** and * for 1% and 5% respectively. 
  Dependent variable 
  Alpha (percent/year) 
Independent 
variable   
Female   
    
1. pre-crisis Period -1.59 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (-1.06) 
    
2. post-crisis Period 1.32 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (1.24) 
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As shown in Table 3.1, the coefficient of the Female variable is negative during 
the pre-crisis period and positive during the post-crisis period. Although the 
results are not significant, the signs seem to suggest that female-managed hedge 
funds actually perform better for the second period (post-crisis) because female 
fund managers are likely to be more cautious and careful when undertaking 
investment decisions amidst times of uncertainty and when there are heightened 
sensitivities to systemic risks.   
 
Interaction variables 
1. Geographical Investment Interaction 
To explore further whether females perform better for investment mandates in 
certain geographical regions, I introduced the concept of interaction variables, 
whereby I multiplied the Female dummy variable with each of the five different 
region dummies. As explained in the Methodology section earlier, for example, if 
the “Female G1” dummy shows a “1”, it represents a female handling an 
investment for the America region. The five regions, as explained earlier are 
namely, America, Europe, Asia including Japan, Asia excluding Japan and Others.  
 
Table 3.2 shows very intriguing results. There is a significantly positive 
coefficient for the variable interacting female and Asia excluding Japan, reporting 
7.49% annually with a t-statistic of 2.66. This means that there is evidence that 
female-managed funds actually perform better for investments in the Asia 
excluding Japan region. Although not significant, other regions such as America, 
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Europe and Others all have positive coefficients, suggesting that female-managed 
funds perform positively in these regions, except for Region 3 which is Asia 
including Japan, which shows a negative but not significant coefficient. On the 
other hand, it is interesting to note that male-managed funds perform significantly 
positive in the “America” and “Others” regions.  
 
Again, similar to earlier analysis, the coefficients for the other explanatory 
variables are in consistent with existing studies. The coefficient for fund age 
variable is negative and significant. The coefficient of the performance fee 
variable is positive. Also, the coefficient of the Standard Deviation variable is 
significantly positive. 
 
Table 3.2: Fama-Macbeth (1973) results with Performance as the 
dependent variable (Including Interaction with 5 investment Geographical 
regions) 
 
Table 3.2 shows results from the Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions with the 
performance measure as the dependent variable. The independent variables used 
are the same as Table 3 with additional interaction variables with 5 Geographical 
regions. There are a total of 10 interaction variables: 5 for Females and 5 for 
Males. Alpha is obtained from using time-series regressions of returns against the 
seven factors from Fung & Hsieh (2004) over a period of 36 months. (T-statistics 
are shown in the parentheses). The significance levels are denoted as ** and * for 
1% and 5% respectively. 
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Independent 
variables 
Dependent variable = Alpha 
(percent/year)  
Female G1 1.80 
  (1.16) 
Female G2 1.67 
  (1.09) 
Female G3 -0.97 
  (-0.48) 
Female G4 7.49** 
  (2.66) 
Female G5 1.84 
  (1.09) 
Male G1 3.03* 
  (2.49) 
Male G2 3.14 
  (1.06) 
Male G3 2.36 
  (1.26) 
Male G4 4.26 
  (1.54) 
Male G5 2.69* 
  (2.01) 
Management fee 22.96 
  (0.47) 
Performance fee 4.37 
  (0.92) 
Fund age in months -0.02* 
  (-2.27) 
Log AUM (fund size) -0.21 
  (-0.97) 
MinInv -0.02 
  (-0.90) 
Redep Notice 0.02* 
  (2.16) 
Stand Dev 129.89** 
  (3.28) 
 
2. Investment Style Interaction 
 
Similar to Table 3.2, the results in Table 3.3 presents very interesting results. The 
coefficients for the interactions with all the first four Styles are positive. Although 
not significant, there is an indication that female-managed funds perform 
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positively for these four Styles namely Relative Value, Security Selection, 
Directional Traders and Multiprocess. Although the “Others” Style shows a 
negative coefficient, it is not significant.  
 
Male-managed funds, on the other hand, performed significantly positive in the 
Relative Value, Security Selection and Multiprocess Styles.  
 
Yet again, similar to earlier on, the coefficients for the other independent variables 
are in consistent with existing studies. The coefficient for fund age variable is 
negative and significant. The coefficient of the performance fee variable is 
positive. Also, the coefficient of the Standard Deviation variable is significantly 
positive. 
Table 3.3: Fama-Macbeth (1973) results with Performance as the 
dependent variable (Including Interaction with 5 Investment Styles) 
 
Table 3.3 shows results from the Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions with the 
performance measure as the dependent variable. The independent variables used 
are the same as Table 3 with additional interaction variables with 5 Investment 
Styles. There are a total of 10 interaction variables: 5 for Females and 5 for Males. 
Alpha is obtained from using time-series regressions of returns against the seven 
factors from Fung & Hsieh (2004) over a period of 36 months. (T-statistics are 
shown in the parentheses). The significance levels are denoted as ** and * for 1% 
and 5% respectively. 
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Independent 
variables 
Dependent variable = Alpha 
(percent/year)  
Female S1 2.23 
  (1.83) 
Female S2 2.90 
  (1.30) 
Female S3 1.38 
  (0.50) 
Female S4 2.37 
  (1.78) 
Female S5 -5.55 
  (-1.31) 
Male S1 4.12** 
  (3.41) 
Male S2 4.31** 
  (2.98) 
Male S3 1.54 
  (0.76) 
Male S4 4.49** 
  (3.63) 
Male S5 -2.23 
  (-0.70) 
Management fee 46.95 
  (1.02) 
Performance fee 4.72 
  (0.93) 
Fund age in months -0.02* 
  (-2.12) 
Log AUM (fund size) -0.38 
  (-1.86) 
MinInv 0.00 
  (-0.15) 
Redep Notice 0.01 
  (0.76) 
Stand Dev 134.31** 
  (3.18) 
 
Next, similar to above Table 3.1 for the basic performance regression results, I 
continued to investigate whether there is a difference in female-managed hedge 
funds’ performance during pre-crisis and post-crisis time periods. Again, I 
subdivided the total evaluation period into 2 subsamples: pre-crisis period 
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(January 1997 to August 2008) and post-crisis period (September 2008 to October 
2014).  
 
For the Geographical regions interactions results in Table 3.4, looking at the 
coefficients, although not significant, the signs seem to suggest that female-
managed hedge funds actually perform better during post-crisis times relative to 
pre-crisis times in two regions: Europe, Asia including Japan. This further helps to 
explain that although in Table 3.2, Region 3 shows the only negative sign for the 
female interaction variable, this Table 3.4 helps to explain that it is only negative 
during the pre-crisis times. This suggests that females are more cautious when 
making investment decisions during times of uncertainty. Therefore, the message 
is clearer when we segregated the total evaluation period into pre and post-crisis 
periods. 
 
For the Investment Style interactions, as shown in Table 3.5, there is a 
significantly positive coefficient of 5.32% annually for the variable interacting 
Female and Relative Value style for the post-crisis period. This means that there is 
clear evidence that female-managed hedge funds actually perform positively in 
the Relative Value style, during the post-crisis period. It is also worthwhile to note 
that for the same style, albeit not significant, the pre-crisis period coefficient is 
negative. 
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Nevertheless, as shown by the Interaction tests results, there are still many 
circumstances whereby male-managed funds appear to perform well. Namely, 
male-managed funds performed significantly positive in the Relative Value, 
Security Selection, and Multiprocess Styles, notably during the pre-crisis period. 
 
Table 3.4: Fama-Macbeth (1973) results with Performance as the 
dependent variable (Including Interaction with 5 investment Geographical 
regions) (2 subsample periods - pre and post-crisis) 
Table 3.4 is a continuation from Table 3.2 and shows results for the 10 
Geographical regions interaction variables: 5 for Females and 5 for Males, for 
the 2 subsample periods. The 2 subsample periods are: (1) pre-crisis period: 
January 1997 to August 2008, (2) post-crisis period: September 2008 to October 
2014. Alpha is obtained from using time-series regressions of returns against the 
seven factors from Fung & Hsieh (2004) over a period of 36 months. (T-statistics 
are shown in the parentheses). The significance levels are denoted as ** and * for 
1% and 5% respectively. 
  
Dependent 
variable 
 
  
Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variable 
Alpha 
(percent/year) 
 
Independent 
variable 
Alpha 
(percent/year) 
Female G1   
 
Male G1   
1. pre-crisis Period 1.92 
 
1. pre-crisis Period 2.96 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (0.94) 
 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (1.85) 
2. post-crisis Period 1.71 
 
2. post-crisis Period 3.16 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (0.74) 
 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (1.76) 
Female G2   
 
Male G2   
1. pre-crisis Period -0.43 
 
1. pre-crisis Period 5.07 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (-0.20) 
 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (1.15) 
2. post-crisis Period 3.42 
 
2. post-crisis Period -0.50 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (1.58) 
 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (-0.27) 
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Female G3   
 
Male G3   
1. pre-crisis Period -2.57 
 
1. pre-crisis Period 2.36 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (-1.04) 
 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (0.94) 
2. post-crisis Period 1.07 
 
2. post-crisis Period 2.36 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (0.32) 
 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (0.89) 
Female G4   
 
Male G4   
1. pre-crisis Period 5.85 
 
1. pre-crisis Period 2.84 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (1.89) 
 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (0.77) 
2. post-crisis Period 9.25 
 
2. post-crisis Period 6.94 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (1.92) 
 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (1.72) 
Female G5   
 
Male G5   
1. pre-crisis Period 1.83 
 
1. pre-crisis Period 3.23 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (0.74) 
 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (1.73) 
2. post-crisis Period 1.84 
 
2. post-crisis Period 1.66 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (1.00) 
 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (1.04) 
 
 
Table 3.5: Fama-Macbeth (1973) results with Performance as the 
dependent variable (Including Interaction with 5 Investment Styles) (2 
subsample periods - pre and post-crisis) 
 
Table 3.5 is a continuation from Table 3.3 and shows results for the 10 
Investment Styles interaction variables: 5 for Females and 5 for Males, for the 2 
subsample periods. The 2 subsample periods are: (1) pre-crisis period: January 
1997 to August 2008, (2) post-crisis period: September 2008 to October 2014. 
Alpha is obtained from using time-series regressions of returns against the seven 
factors from Fung & Hsieh (2004) over a period of 36 months. (T-statistics are 
shown in the parentheses). The significance levels are denoted as ** and * for 1% 
and 5% respectively. 
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Dependent 
variable 
 
  
Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variable 
Alpha 
(percent/year) 
 
Independent 
variable 
Alpha 
(percent/year) 
Female S1   
 
Male S1   
1. pre-crisis Period -0.25 
 
1. pre-crisis Period 4.65** 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (-0.15) 
 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (2.85) 
2. post-crisis Period 5.32** 
 
2. post-crisis Period 3.11 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (3.11) 
 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (1.91) 
Female S2   
 
Male S2   
1. pre-crisis Period 1.71 
 
1. pre-crisis Period 5.40** 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (0.55) 
 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (2.85) 
2. post-crisis Period 4.92 
 
2. post-crisis Period 2.25 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (1.69) 
 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (1.05) 
Female S3   
 
Male S3   
1. pre-crisis Period 2.59 
 
1. pre-crisis Period 1.09 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (0.62) 
 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (0.37) 
2. post-crisis Period -0.19 
 
2. post-crisis Period 2.39 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (-0.06) 
 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (1.14) 
Female S4   
 
Male S4   
1. pre-crisis Period 1.95 
 
1. pre-crisis Period 5.79** 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (1.17) 
 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (3.46) 
2. post-crisis Period 2.83 
 
2. post-crisis Period 2.05 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (1.34) 
 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (1.24) 
Female S5   
 
Male S5   
1. pre-crisis Period NA 
 
1. pre-crisis Period -2.54 
     (Jan97-Aug08) NA 
 
     (Jan97-Aug08) (-0.50) 
2. post-crisis Period -5.55 
 
2. post-crisis Period -1.74 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (-1.31) 
 
    (Sep08-Oct14) (-0.85) 
 
 
In order to explore further, I also examined female managers’ risk-taking 
behaviour and strategy distinctiveness in the following results sections. 
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4.1.2  Risks  
 
Table 4: Fama-Macbeth (1973) results with Risk measure as the dependent 
variable 
Table 4 shows results from the Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions with the Risk 
measure as the dependent variable. SD represents the standard deviations of the 
past 12 months’ excess returns. In the multivariate analysis, the independent 
variables are the management fees, performance fee, fund age, the log of assets 
under management, minimum investment amount, notice period for redemption 
and dummies for both regions and styles. Period is from January 1997 to October 
2014. (T-statistics are shown in the parentheses). The significance levels are 
denoted as ** and * for 1% and 5% respectively. 
Independent 
variables 
Dependent variable =  
SD (per month, no %)  
Female -0.01** 
  (-18.78) 
Management fee 0.39** 
  (25.07) 
Performance fee 0.00 
  (0.60) 
Fund age in months 0.00** 
  (26.80) 
Log AUM (fund size) 0.00** 
  (-30.11) 
MinInv 0.00** 
  (-3.53) 
Redep Notice 0.00** 
  (5.29) 
Region 1 0.00** 
  (-17.68) 
Region 2 0.01** 
  (7.25) 
Region 3 0.00 
  (-0.62) 
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Region 4 0.01** 
  (19.51) 
Style 1 -0.02** 
  (-13.91) 
Style 2 0.00 
  (1.69) 
Style 3 0.00** 
  (3.55) 
Style 4 -0.01** 
  (-9.31) 
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As shown in the Table 4, females in this data set took lower risks as the 
coefficient of the Female variable is significantly negative at the 1% level. This is 
consistent with the literature which says that females take lesser risks (eg. Byrnes 
et al., 1999). Since the results show that females take lower risks, these results 
provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.  
 
4.1.3  Strategy Distinctiveness  
 
Table 5: Fama-Macbeth (1973) results with SDI as the dependent variable  
Table 5 shows results from the Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions with the 
“Strategy Distinctiveness Index” (SDI) as the dependent variable. SDI is 
calculated by subtracting from 1, the correlation of the individual fund with all 
funds in the same style category for the past 24 months. In the multivariate 
analysis, the independent variables are the management fees, performance fee, 
fund age, the log of assets under management, minimum investment amount, 
notice period for redemption and dummies for both regions and styles. Period is 
from January 1997 to October 2014. (T-statistics are shown in the parentheses). 
The significance levels are denoted as ** and * for 1% and 5% respectively. 
Independent variables 
 Dependent variable =  
Sdi (per month, no %) 
Female -0.05** 
  (-9.82) 
Management fee -0.33* 
  (-2.08) 
Performance fee 0.21** 
  (7.66) 
Fund age in months 0.00** 
  (-4.58) 
Log AUM (fund size) 0.00** 
 
(-5.90) 
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MinInv 0.00 
  (1.10) 
Redep Notice 0.00** 
  (-5.31) 
Region 1 0.00 
  (-1.35) 
Region 2 0.00 
  (0.47) 
Region 3 0.04** 
  (10.38) 
Region 4 -0.04** 
  (-6.48) 
Style 1 -0.01 
  (-0.89) 
Style 2 -0.07** 
  (-6.87) 
Style 3 -0.07** 
  (-8.41) 
Style 4 -0.05** 
  (-4.88) 
 
The results shown in Table 5 are consistent with our Hypothesis 3. Female 
managers are less distinctive in their strategies. The multivariate test above shows 
a significantly negative coefficient for the Female variable of 0.05 per month. 
 
4.1.4  Flow 
 
I tested the relationship between flow into the fund at end of month ‘m’ and 
whether there was a female manager in the prior month ‘m-1’. At the same time, I 
added a variable to test for the interaction of the Female variable with the Returns 
variable, to examine the sensitivity of flows to female-managed funds, conditional 
on returns. I performed the tests separately for three levels of Returns – “Low”, 
“Medium” and “High”, for which results are shown in the following Tables 6.1, 
6.2 and 6.3 respectively. 
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As shown in Table 6.1, the coefficient of the female variable is -0.03, with a t-
statistic of 1.95, suggesting that female-managed funds over this period have 
lesser inflows relative to male-managed funds, especially when the funds' returns 
are small. Also, as shown in all 3 tables on Flows, most of the coefficients of the 
interaction of the Female variable with the Returns variable are positive across the 
three tables, indicating, though not significantly, that fund flows into and out of 
female-managed funds are more sensitive to the return outcomes. Notably, higher 
return tended to induce more inflows relative to male-managed funds, and lower 
returns induced more outflows relative to the male-managed funds. 
 
 
Further, the coefficient estimates for the Returns variables are mostly positive 
across the categories of Returns, which is in consistent with existing studies. The 
performance of a fund as the core factor for choosing one has been well-
documented. Money flows into a fund that reports good performance (eg. Sirri & 
Tufano, 1998; Chevalier & Ellison, 1997).  
 
The coefficients on the other control variables are also consistent with existing 
research. As reflected by the significantly negative coefficients of the fund size 
variable, it shows that the money flows are attracted to smaller funds (Sirri & 
Tufano, 1998). Also, similar to flow studies incorporating the age of the funds, the 
results indicate a significantly negative coefficient on the fund age variable 
(Evans, 2010) for most of the categories of Returns. 
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Table 6.1: Fama-Macbeth (1973) results with Flow as the dependent variable 
(1 month lag) (Subsample 1 - Low Returns) 
 
Table 6.1 shows results from the Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions with the 
“Flow” at time m as the dependent variable, which is defined as [AUMi,m – 
(AUMi,m-1* (1 + Reti,m))]/(AUMi,m-1), where AUMi,m is fund i's total assets under 
management at time m, and Reti,m is fund i's return over the previous month. Flow 
is measured at the end of the period. In the multivariate analysis, the independent 
variables are the management fees, performance fee, fund age, the log of assets 
under management, minimum investment amount, notice period for redemption 
and dummies for both regions and styles. Period is from January 1997 to October 
2014. I also control for prior period’s returns. All control variables are at time m, 
except Female and Returns which are both at 1 month lag (T-statistics are shown 
in the parentheses). The significance levels are denoted as ** and * for 1% and 
5% respectively. 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable =  
Flow at time m  
(per month, no %) 
Female (1 month lag or (m-1)) -0.03 
  (-1.95) 
Returns (1 month lag or (m-1)) 0.16 
  (1.10) 
Female (m-1) * Returns (m-1) 2.02 
 (0.95) 
Management fee -1.03 
  (-0.96) 
Performance fee 0.14 
  (1.58) 
Fund age in months 0.00 
  (-0.80) 
Log AUM (fund size) -0.03** 
  (-2.83) 
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MinInv 0.00 
  (1.57) 
Redep Notice 0.00 
  (1.55) 
Region 1 -0.04** 
  (-2.62) 
Region 2 -0.01 
  (-1.51) 
Region 3 0.07 
  (0.92) 
Region 4 -0.03* 
  (-2.31) 
Style 1 0.02 
  (0.94) 
Style 2 0.02 
  (0.97) 
Style 3 0.02 
  (1.19) 
Style 4 0.03 
  (1.43) 
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Table 6.2: Fama-Macbeth (1973) results with Flow as the dependent variable 
(1 month lag) (Subsample 2 - Medium Returns) 
 
Table 6.2 shows results from the Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions with the 
“Flow” at time m as the dependent variable, which is defined as [AUMi,m – 
(AUMi,m-1* (1 + Reti,m))]/(AUMi,m-1), where AUMi,m is fund i's total assets under 
management at time m, and Reti,m is fund i's return over the previous month. Flow 
is measured at the end of the period. In the multivariate analysis, the independent 
variables are the management fees, performance fee, fund age, the log of assets 
under management, minimum investment amount, notice period for redemption 
and dummies for both regions and styles. Period is from January 1997 to October 
2014. I also control for prior period’s returns. All control variables are at time m, 
except Female and Returns which are both at 1 month lag (T-statistics are shown 
in the parentheses). The significance levels are denoted as ** and * for 1% and 
5% respectively. 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable =  
Flow at time m  
(per month, no %) 
Female (1 month lag or (m-1)) 0.01 
  (0.21) 
Returns (1 month lag or (m-1)) 0.11 
  (0.28) 
Female (m-1) * Returns (m-1) -2.09 
 (-0.85) 
Management fee 0.24 
  (0.62) 
Performance fee -0.03 
  (-1.13) 
Fund age in months 0.00** 
  (-11.66) 
Log AUM (fund size) -0.02** 
  (-7.43) 
MinInv 0.00 
  (0.51) 
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Redep Notice 0.00 
  (-0.77) 
Region 1 0.00 
  (-0.89) 
Region 2 0.00 
  (0.72) 
Region 3 0.00 
  (-0.69) 
Region 4 -0.02** 
  (-4.37) 
Style 1 0.01 
  (1.20) 
Style 2 0.00 
  (-0.79) 
Style 3 0.00 
  (0.13) 
Style 4 0.01 
  (0.81) 
 
  
 57 
 
Table 6.3: Fama-Macbeth (1973) results with Flow as the dependent variable 
(1 month lag) (Subsample 3 - High Returns) 
 
Table 6.3 shows results from the Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions with the 
“Flow” at time m as the dependent variable, which is defined as [AUMi,m – 
(AUMi,m-1* (1 + Reti,m))]/(AUMi,m-1), where AUMi,m is fund i's total assets under 
management at time m, and Reti,m is fund i's return over the previous month. Flow 
is measured at the end of the period. In the multivariate analysis, the independent 
variables are the management fees, performance fee, fund age, the log of assets 
under management, minimum investment amount, notice period for redemption 
and dummies for both regions and styles. Period is from January 1997 to October 
2014. I also control for prior period’s returns. All control variables are at time m, 
except Female and Returns which are both at 1 month lag (T-statistics are shown 
in the parentheses). The significance levels are denoted as ** and * for 1% and 
5% respectively. 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable =  
Flow at time m  
(per month, no %) 
Female (1 month lag or (m-1)) 0.01 
  (0.10) 
Returns (1 month lag or (m-1)) -0.05 
  (-1.10) 
Female (m-1) * Returns (m-1) 0.06 
 (0.05) 
Management fee 0.01 
  (0.02) 
Performance fee 0.00 
  (-0.09) 
Fund age in months 0.00** 
  (-9.54) 
Log AUM (fund size) -0.02** 
  (-8.29) 
MinInv 0.00 
  (1.13) 
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Redep Notice 0.00 
  (0.46) 
Region 1 -0.01* 
  (-2.15) 
Region 2 0.00 
  (-0.32) 
Region 3 0.01 
  (0.63) 
Region 4 -0.02** 
  (-2.69) 
Style 1 0.00 
  (0.09) 
Style 2 -0.01 
  (-0.53) 
Style 3 0.00 
  (-0.28) 
Style 4 0.00 
  (-0.01) 
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4.2  Triple Sorts Approach 
 
Table 7: Triple Sorts – All Periods 
Table 7 shows results of the test of the difference in mean Appraisal Ratio from 
Female and Male-managed funds in the 18 classifications, obtained using 3 hedge 
fund characteristics, namely Assets under Management (“AUM”), Performance 
fees and Redemption Notice period. For each classification, the coefficient of the 
difference in mean Appraisal Ratio and their t-statistics are reported. Period is 
from January 1997 to October 2014. The significance levels are denoted as ** 
and * for 1% and 5% respectively. In each classification, the average number of 
Females and Males over time is also reported.  
Segments 
F-M  
Appraisal ratio   
(monthly coeff, 
no%) tstat of coeff 
Average 
Females 
Average 
Males 
SLS -1.00 -0.89 16.24 599.34 
SLM -0.93 -0.84 42.02 1345.10 
SLL -1.03 -0.82 16.56 347.12 
SMS -0.96 -0.86 15.45 575.05 
SMM -0.94 -0.84 43.29 1425.81 
SML -0.98 -0.81 16.85 359.77 
SHS -1.35 -0.89 0.75 29.34 
SHM -1.10 -0.83 1.28 80.71 
SHL -1.57 -0.85 0.52 24.54 
LLS 0.10 1.30 17.22 593.73 
LLM 0.07 1.20 40.36 1147.64 
LLL 0.16 1.54 11.64 327.49 
LMS 0.00 0.07 17.39 639.92 
LMM 0.06 1.05 47.13 1403.63 
LML 0.15 1.39 13.77 380.81 
LHS 0.22 1.45 0.27 24.64 
LHM 0.33 1.37 0.49 66.02 
LHL 0.33 1.36 0.00 16.91 
(For AUM):S:Small, L:Large; (For Pfees): L:Low, M:Medium, H:High; (For 
Notice period): S:Short, M:Medium, L:Long  
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Table 7.1: Triple Sorts – pre-crisis period: 
This is a continuation from Table 7 and provides results for the first subsample 
period. The first subsample period is: pre-crisis period: January 1997 to August 
2008. The significance levels are denoted as ** and * for 1% and 5% respectively. 
Segments 
F-M  
Appraisal ratio   
(monthly coeff, 
no%) tstat of coeff 
Average 
Females 
Average 
Males 
SLS -1.52 -0.90 12.79 487.41 
SLM -1.47 -0.86 23.22 850.24 
SLL -1.76 -0.85 8.81 255.85 
SMS -1.50 -0.88 11.59 419.75 
SMM -1.47 -0.86 24.64 891.18 
SML -1.63 -0.84 9.26 267.19 
SHS -2.23 -0.91 1.04 15.14 
SHM -1.70 -0.86 1.41 40.94 
SHL -3.02 -0.87 0.36 10.80 
LLS 0.10 0.87 17.57 502.30 
LLM 0.08 0.84 31.34 825.96 
LLL 0.24 1.36 6.71 231.18 
LMS -0.03 -0.32 17.10 505.16 
LMM 0.08 0.85 31.74 869.34 
LML 0.23 1.31 7.15 243.54 
LHS 0.50 1.37 0.41 16.37 
LHM 0.50 1.38 0.41 43.38 
LHL 0.50 1.37 0.00 10.94 
(For AUM):S:Small, L:Large; (For Pfees): L:Low, M:Medium, H:High; (For 
Notice period): S:Short, M:Medium, L:Long  
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Table 7.2: Triple Sorts – post-crisis period: 
This is a continuation from Table 7 and provides results for the first subsample 
period. The first subsample period is: post-crisis period: September 2008 to 
October 2014. The significance levels are denoted as ** and * for 1% and 5% 
respectively. 
Segments 
F-M  
Appraisal ratio   
(monthly coeff,  
no%) tstat of coeff 
Average 
Females 
Average 
Males 
SLS 0.00 -0.09 7.88 280.47 
SLM 0.03** 2.91 26.83 788.87 
SLL 0.04** 3.12 10.79 179.74 
SMS 0.02 1.57 7.87 300.44 
SMM 0.02* 2.36 27.18 842.80 
SML 0.03** 2.77 10.79 184.98 
SHS 0.03* 2.33 0.07 19.43 
SHM 0.03 0.99 0.35 53.93 
SHL 0.03 1.00 0.28 17.47 
LLS 0.03** 2.80 5.72 265.12 
LLM 0.02* 2.43 19.86 607.29 
LLL 0.02 1.86 7.26 176.25 
LMS 0.02 1.90 6.21 309.44 
LMM 0.01 1.33 26.36 834.90 
LML 0.01 0.78 9.09 221.49 
LHS 0.01 0.84 0.00 13.93 
LHM 0.00 -0.23 0.22 37.64 
LHL 0.00 -0.26 0.00 9.75 
(For AUM):S:Small, L:Large; (For Pfees): L:Low, M:Medium, H:High; (For 
Notice period): S:Short, M:Medium, L:Long  
 
Interestingly, Table 7, which shows triple sort results for all periods, contains 
negative coefficients for “F-M” for the small funds and positive coefficients for 
the large funds. However, none of these coefficients are significant. Moving on to 
the triple sorts for the pre-crisis period, January 1997 to August 2008, in Table 
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7.1, again we see the same phenomenon: negative coefficients for the small funds 
and mostly positive for the large funds, but all of these tests are not significant.  
 
For the post-crisis period, September 2008 to October 2014, the results are 
outstanding. Table 7.2 shows that most of the coefficients are positive and many 
are significant. The significantly positive segments are “SLM’, “SLL”, “SMM”, 
“SML”, “SHS”, “LLS,” and “LLM”. These results portray a strong message about 
the performance of female-managed funds during periods of different risks. 
Consistent with Table 3.1, these triple sort results suggest that female-managed 
hedge funds actually perform better than male-managed ones during post-crisis 
times because they tend to be more conservative and cautious during the times 
when financial markets are bubbling in uncertainty and volatility.  
 
Hence, our Hypothesis 2 on female-managed hedge funds underperform male-
managed hedge funds does not hold on a risk-adjusted basis. 
 
 
4.3 Portfolio Approach – Garch in mean 
 
As explained earlier in the methodology section, the Garch-in-mean method is 
employed in using the portfolio or time series approach. This method introduces 
another explanatory variable: contemporaneous return variance. This was 
estimated using the GARCH (1,1) model. The model contains variance as 
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endogenous in the mean equation instead of standard deviation. This is because 
the use of standard deviation produces non-convergence due to a very flat 
maximum likelihood function. 
 
There are two sets of results, one for Females and one for Males. The results in 
Table 8 provide more compelling evidence that female-managed hedge funds do 
not underperform Male-managed funds, lending no support to Hypothesis 2, 
which is consistent with the Fama-MacBeth (1973) results. In fact, this time-series 
results for the entire period (January 1997 to October 2014) shows a significant 
positive alpha for Females, with c0 of 0.3664. Although the c0 for Males shows a 
higher alpha of 1.41, it is not significant. Hence, it shows that female-managed 
hedge funds actually reported a significantly positive risk-adjusted alpha. 
 
Next, a look at the variances for female-managed funds and male-managed funds 
tells an interesting story. The cost of variance in Risk premium is higher for 
females with a “b” coefficient estimate of 19.29 and is smaller for males at 15.96. 
These results indicate that female managers are more particular about taking on 
risk and likely to require a higher risk premium for compensation. This is 
consistent with the earlier Fama-Macbeth (1973) results with risks as the 
dependent variable, showing that females take on lower risks. 
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Table 8: Portfolio Approach – Garch in mean 
Table 8 shows results from the portfolio sorting approach for each of the 2 
categories: Females (‘F”), Males (“M”). Dependent variables, “YF” and “YM”, 
represent the value-weighted mean Excess Returns for Females and Males 
respectively. Excess Returns are the Returns of the fund in excess of the risk-free 
rate. Time-series regressions of mean excess returns are run against the seven 
factors from Fung & Hsieh (2004) over the period from January 1997 to October 
2014. The seven factors are Equity (the excess of Standard and Poor’s 500 returns 
over the risk-free return); Size (the Russell 2000 index monthly total return minus 
Standard & Poor’s 500 monthly total return); BondMkt (the change per month in 
the 10-year treasury constant maturity yield); CreditSprd (the change per month in 
the Moody's Baa yield minus 10-year treasury constant maturity yield) and three 
trend-following risk factors: TF-Bond, TF-Currency and TF-Comm. Variance of 
Excess Returns at time m is also added as an independent variable, based on 
Garch-in-mean method. The coefficients of the independent variables and their 
significance levels are reported. 
  Dep Var: YF 
 
    Dep Var: YM 
   coeff stdr 
 
  coeff stdr 
c0 0.3664 0.0555 
 
c0 1.4100 1.7109 
c1 -0.0071 0.0565 
 
c1 0.8735 1.2363 
c2 -0.0090 0.0565 
 
c2 0.8166 1.2341 
c3 -0.0078 0.0565 
 
c3 -1.3598 3.5776 
c4 -0.4789 0.0399 
 
c4 -3.5566 0.8715 
c5 0.0702 0.0268 
 
c5 0.7230 1.2320 
c6 0.0330 0.0502 
 
c6 0.7384 1.2308 
c7 0.0342 0.0501 
 
c7 0.7306 1.2311 
b 19.286 0.4823 
 
b 15.9617 0.0806 
d0 0.0000 0.0000 
 
d0 0.0003 0.0000 
d1 0.8034 0.0093 
 
d1 0.8064 0.0003 
d2 0.0003 0.0001   d2 0.0008 0.0000 
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5.  Conclusion and Limitations  
 
The primary results from the Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions portray a strong 
message. There is no evidence of underperformance of female-managed funds 
after controlling for total risks of the funds themselves. In fact, as shown later, 
when interaction variables are included in the analyses, a number of female-
managed funds actually perform better than the male-managed funds. For 
example, there is evidence that female-managed funds performed significantly 
better in Asia (excluding Japan).  
 
There is also evidence that female-managed hedge funds performance is 
significantly positive on a risk-adjusted basis, in the Relative Value style, during 
the post-crisis period (September 2008 to October 2014). To add a further boost to 
the message, as we segment all funds into three fund characteristics using the 
Triple Sorts approach, results are significantly positive for the “F-M” Appraisal 
Ratio for many of the eighteen segments, notably during the post-crisis period. 
Therefore, the Hypothesis 2 that female-managed hedge funds underperform is 
not supported.  
 
Finally, as I test using the time-series Portfolio approach to further examine the 
performance of female-managed hedge funds, I show that there is a significant 
positive alpha for Females, with a constant estimate of 0.3664. Although the 
Males results show a higher alpha of 1.41, it is not significant. This was based on 
the Garch-in-mean method, introducing variance as endogenous into the analyses. 
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These time-series results are consistent with the earlier message that female-
managed hedge funds do not underperform male-managed funds on a risk-
adjusted basis. 
 
The study also shows that females definitely do not like to take risks as shown by 
the negative coefficient on the Female variable when Risk measure was used as 
the dependent variable in the Fama-MacBeth (1973) analysis. There is also minor 
indication that female-managed funds have lesser inflows relative to male-
managed funds, especially when the funds' returns are small. Moreover, fund 
flows into and out of female-managed funds are more sensitive to the return 
outcomes.  
 
Overall, judging from the above results, after controlling for total risks (as funds 
do not typically hold a completely large diversified portfolio) across different 
funds, female-managed funds appear to perform better in numerous 
circumstances. For example, female-managed hedge funds perform better during 
post-crisis times, for investments using the Relative Value Style and also when 
investments are in Asia (excluding Japan). However, there are still many 
conditions in which male-managed funds seem to perform better. Namely, male-
managed funds performance was significantly positive in the Relative Value, 
Security Selection, and Multiprocess Styles, notably during the pre-crisis period 
and also when investments are in the “America” and “Others” regions.  
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I recognise that my data is conditional on funds which have returns when alive 
and so it ignores the last month when they become dead. The assumed losses in 
the month when the fund becomes dead is not available. Going forward, I 
recommend for future studies to look into including the data when the fund 
becomes dead as it may further explain how female-managed hedge funds 
perform relative to male-managed funds.  
 
In sum, this study makes contributions to current research in hedge funds and 
especially Gender research in the fields of finance or psychology. It shows that the 
reason for a relatively smaller number of females in the financial world may not 
necessarily be due to their performance. This is because this study found no 
evidence of the underperformance of female-managed hedge funds. Actually, as 
shown in Figure 3, even though there were fewer female managers at the 
beginning of our sample period, the number started to grow since the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis. This is in line with our results that since female-managed hedge 
funds tend to perform better during post-crisis times, there is a rising number of 
them ever since the Global Financial Crisis.  
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